The proceedings of the 9/11 commission Tuesday showed how deeply dysfunctional America's federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies became as the threat of terrorism mounted. The FBI, in particular, was the target of a justified indictment.
Testimony by present and former officials and reports by the panel's staff demonstrated that the FBI's success in charging perpetrators of pre-9/11 attacks hid a bureaucratic shambles. The bureau was ill-equipped, ill-organized and shackled by dogma that barred counterterrorism and criminal agents from sharing information.
Much was going wrong through the eight Clinton years and President Bush's 233 days in the White House. The FBI was saddled with Stone Age information technology, intelligence gathering was given short shrift, and too many agents stayed focused on traditional crime.
Most seriously, the Justice Department erected a so-called wall that was designed to prevent FBI intelligence gatherers from communicating with field investigators. The rationale was to protect against civil liberties abuses, but the effects were devastating.
None are more infuriating than the events surrounding 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. After long delays, the CIA notified the FBI in August 2001 that both suspected terrorists were in the United States, but the FBI's National Security Law Unit refused to allow investigators probing al-Qaeda to help in the hunt.
A frustrated agent presciently summed up the insanity this way: "Whatever has happened to this - someday, someone will die - and wall or not - the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain 'problems.' Let's hope the National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decision then, especially since the biggest threat to us, (Osama bin Laden), is getting the most protection."
Every official who testified bore some measure of responsibility. Former Attorney General Janet Reno erected the "wall." Former FBI Director Louis Freeh failed to reorient the bureau's priorities and reform its management. Attorney General John Ashcroft paid less attention to terrorism and gave the fight less financial support than he should have before 9/11. Most damning, former acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard quoted Ashcroft as saying he didn't want further briefings on the al-Qaida threat, which Ashcroft denied.
The panel's indictment now cries out for action. Bush is studying how to reform U.S. intelligence, and the commission will issue its own recommendations. Some are suggesting an overhaul that would create a domestic security agency akin to Britain's MI5. All options should be on the table. But Bush must start by making sure that every remnant of the "wall" was swept away after 9/11 and by demonstrating that the FBI under new management has the right tools and the right culture for waging the terror war.
