Excerpts from Sept. 11 panel hearing

Excerpts from Tuesday's hearing by the federal commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks:

COMMISSIONER RICHARD BEN-VENISTE: To your knowledge, coming back to the United States, was the intelligence information accumulated by the year 2001 regarding various plots, real or otherwise, to crash planes using suicide pilots integrated into any air defense plan for protecting the homeland, and particularly our nation's capital?

FORMER FBI DIRECTOR LOUIS J. FREEH: I'm not aware of such a plan.

BEN-VENISTE: Can you explain why it was, given the fact that we knew this information, and given the fact that, as we know now, our air defense system on 9-11 was looking outward in a Cold War-posture, rather than inward in a protective posture, that we didn't have such a plan? Was that a failure of the Clinton administration, was that a failure of the Bush administration, given all of the information that we had accumulated at that time?

FREEH: I don't know that I would characterize it as a failure by either administration.

I know, you know, by that time there were air defense systems with respect to the White House. There were air defense systems that the military command in the Washington, D.C., area, you know, had incorporated.

I don't think there were probably - at least I never was aware of a plan that contemplated commercial airliners being used as weapons after a hijacking. I don't think that was integrated in any plan.

But with respect to air defense issues and that threat, it was clearly known and it was incorporated, as I mentioned, into standard special events planning.

COMMISSIONER CHAIRMAN THOMAS H. KEAN: I read our staff statement as an indictment of the FBI for over a long period of time. ...

The present director, your successor, has a whole series of reforms that he is trying to put to make the agency work better. You tried reforms. You tried very hard to reform the agency. According to our staff report, those reforms failed.

I guess my question to you is, looking at this director's efforts to reform the agency, can those reforms work or should there be some more fundamental changes to the agency and the way we get our intelligence?

FREEH: Well, first of all, I take exception to your comment that your staff report is an indictment of the FBI. I think your staff report evidences some very good work and some very diligent interviews and a very technical, almost auditing, analysis of some of the programs.

I think the centerpiece of your executive director's report, as I heard it, came down to resources and legal authorities.

So I would ask that you balance what you call an indictment, and which I don't agree with at all, with the two primary findings of your staff. One is that there was a lack of resources. And two, there were legal impediments.

With respect to your question, I certainly support and applaud the director's efforts. The Patriot Act, the court of review, a couple of billion dollars is certainly a big help when we're talking about changes.

With respect to the jurisdiction of the FBI, I do not believe that we should establish a separate domestic intelligence agency with respect to counterterrorism. I think that would be a huge mistake for the country for a number of reasons.

One, I don't think in the United States we will tolerate very well what, in effect, is a state secret police even with all of the protections and the constitutional entitlements that we would subscribe it with. Americans, I don't think, like secret police. And you would, in effect, be establishing a secret police.

Secondly, if you look at the models around the world where this has been tried, it hasn't worked very well, in my opinion.

The other thing, it would take a long time to integrate. If the Homeland Security Department and 170,000 people to be integrated is going to take a couple of years, standing up a brand new domestic intelligence agency would take a decade and we would lose very precious time at a very dangerous time for the United States.

COMMISSIONER BOB KERREY: But even absent a declaration of war, why did we let their soldiers into the United States? Because that's what the al-Qaida men were, they were soldiers. ...

FREEH: Well, again, I think part of my answer is that we weren't fighting a real war. We hadn't declared war on these enemies in the manner that you suggest that would have prevented entry had we taken war measures and put the country and its intelligence and law enforcement agencies on a war footing. ...

A war footing means we seal borders. A war footing means we detain people that we're suspicious of. A war footing means that we have statutes like the Patriot Act, although with time set provisions, give us new powers.

We weren't doing that.

Now, whether there was a political will for it or not, I guess we could debate that. But the fact of the matter is we didn't do it and we were using grand jury subpoenas and arrest warrants to fight an enemy that was using missiles and suicide boats to attack our warships.

COMMISSION VICE CHAIRMAN LEE H. HAMILTON: I took a quick look at the appropriations for the FBI from 1996 to 2001. It went up from $2.3 billion to $3.3 billion, roughly. That's a very, very dramatic increase.

The amount of FBI personnel and funding dedicated to counterterrorism more than tripled between 1993 and 2001. ...

My sense of your testimony is that you could have done an awful lot better if you'd had a lot more resources. And in fact, you were receiving a lot more resources.

FREEH: No, there's no question we were receiving a lot of resources. I think my position, which was the attorney general's position, is there were not enough resources to work a counterterrorism program as the lead agency for the United States.

As I said in my testimony, the FBI had 3.5 percent of the government's counterterrorism resources.

And as you see in my recommendations - you know, the FBI only has 200 more agents now than it had back in 1999. It's not just a question of allocating agents from criminal programs to counterterrorism programs. It's really substantially enhancing not just the numbers, but the training, the expertise, the continuity of people in that particular program.

COMMISSIONER SLADE GORTON: The staff report reads, "The FBI's inability or unwillingness to share information reportedly frustrated White House national security officials. According to the former national counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke, the National Security Council never received anything in writing from the FBI whatsoever.

"Former Deputy National Security Adviser James Steinberg stated that the only time that the FBI provided the National Security Council with relevant information was during the millennium crisis. Clarke told us that Attorney General (Janet) Reno was notified that the National Security Council could not run an effective counterterrorism program without access to FBI information."

Is that a correct characterization?

FREEH: I don't think it is.

I can't speak for the frustration of other people, but with respect to sharing information, you know, I didn't provide written memos to (former National Security Adviser) Sandy Berger or the president or anybody else at the NSC, but as I said before, the attorney general and I, every two weeks, almost like clockwork in the last 14 or 15 months of our overlapping tenure, sat with Sandy Berger in his office for at least an hour, perhaps two hours, and went over every single piece of counterterrorism, counterintelligence case that we have.

ROEMER: In your role at the number two position at the FBI and acting director, I'm interested in knowing what you were telling the highest government officials, briefing them about the threat leading into the spring and the summer of 2001. ... Did you ever brief the vice president of the United States on counterterrorism?

FORMER ACTING FBI DIRECTOR THOMAS PICKARD: Yes, I did. ... I recall one time that he came over to FBI headquarters on March 16. I believe he came another time, but I was not present. I did not personally do the briefing. Director Freeh and Assistant Director Watson did them.

ROEMER: And did you brief the vice president on an al-Qaida presence in the United States?

PICKARD: Yes.

ROEMER: And what was his reaction?

PICKARD: He was surprised that al-Qaida was here in the United States, as was the attorney general. We told them we had coverage on them. And as I explained earlier, we also have Hamas, Hezbollah, many other terrorist groups. We also have intelligence agents from foreign countries here in the United States.

With the laws and regulations we have, we try to utilize anything we can to thwart their efforts. But if they haven't crossed a line, if they haven't done something illegal, we don't have an opportunity to do anything with them.

ROEMER: Did you brief the attorney general on terrorism?

PICKARD: Yes, I did. ... At least three times.

ROEMER: Three times. And what were the attorney general's priorities with respect to terrorism? Was it a top tier priority for the attorney general?

PICKARD: It was a top tier for the FBI. The attorney general on May 10th issued budget guidance for us, and I did not see that as a top item on his agenda.

ROEMER: Did you take that to the attorney general that you were concerned that that was not a top item for him? And is this the $58 million that you're concerned about?

PICKARD: No, that was later. This was the budget guidance that came out on May 10th.

During the summer of 2001, the FBI submitted what I believe was our 2003 budget proposal. That proposal came back and the additional funds that we were looking for on counterterrorism were denied. I spoke to the attorney general briefly and asked him if I could appeal it and he told me, yes, I could, put it in writing. I had our finance and counterterrorism people put together an appeal of that decision. And then on September 12th, I read the denial of that appeal from the attorney general.

ROEMER: So you had a May 10th memo on the attorney general's priorities that you objected to.

And then you had a meeting in August where you personally appealed to the attorney general and received a letter from him saying no to the increases that you received on what date?

PICKARD: I received that on September 12th, that denial.

ROEMER: So what does this say about counterterrorism as a priority for the attorney general? Do you think it was not the priority that you hoped it would be, commensurate with the FBI's?

PICKARD: I only had the perspective to see it from my view of the FBI. I don't know all that the attorney general had to look at with the hundred thousand employees of the Department of Justice.

KEAN: Ambassador Black, using hindsight now, if we were able to recognize the kind of tragedy that was going to happen, what would you have done differently? What did we do wrong?

FORMER CIA COUNTERRORISM CENTER DIRECTOR J. COFER BLACK: Well, I tell you, I would start from the standpoint that when I started this job in 1999, I thought there was a good chance I was going to be sitting right here in front of you. And I was mentally prepared for it all along.

The enemy we're up against is one that I've been operating against since the early '90s. I know these guys. I know what they want to do. I know how dedicated they are. And they were coming at us hard.

And, you know, we did all that we could at our level to engage these guys to try and produce the kinds of intelligence, produce the kinds of leads. And the men and women that did this, governor, that serve this country in war, out front, did a fantastic job.

On the one side, you have catastrophic failure, more than 3,000 people dead. And no one is more bothered by this than us. But we engaged these targets. You'll never hear from us, oh, you know, we didn't get it. Oh, we got it all right. We knew what we were up against. We gave it all we had.

The big bottom line here, you know, people come up with these grand ideas for improvement, you know, big computers, whatever. The bottom line here, I've got to tell you, and I'll take part of the blame on this, I kind of failed my people, despite doing everything I could. We didn't have enough people to do the job. And we didn't have enough money by magnitudes. And that could give you comparisons you likely wouldn't believe. We used to talk about it at the Counterterrorism Center.

You know, this goes in the '90s. I mean, this has been so hard-wired. You know, by the time we get up to the recent past, and this train is on this track and this is where it's going. Hell, I don't even know if we ever could have got it off without some kind of catastrophe. I will tell you, you know, going back to the '90s, doing the terrorist target, the only way we ever got more money essentially, was we would spend ahead of the curve and run out.

And people talk about the millennium threat. I can remember, we were spending money on the millennium threat, went to the director. I said, "Mr. (CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE) Tenet, we're spending money here. We are not going to make it to the end of the fiscal year. We're going to be three months short. We're going to have to stop. And, you know, we won't be able to operate." He signaled me aside, and he said, "Well, you know, do what's right for the country, blow it out." So we did.

We spent, you know, after the millennium threat was over, we spent our time trying to get the money to make up for that which we spent, or - and I'm just not going to go into that kind of language I use, which is very graphic - but, unfortunately, when Americans get killed it would translate into additional resources.

It was a constant track: Either you run out or people die. When people die, you get more money. And you know, it would have been better if we as a country had made the commitment to provide our counterterrorist warriors the resources and the numbers so they could do the best job they could.

But what I want to leave you with, I mean, that's all I want to leave you with. The people that did this are heroes and we didn't give them what they needed to fight and win. It's that simple.

COMMISSIONER JAMES R. THOMPSON: Acting Director Pickard testified this afternoon that he briefed you twice on al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden, and when he sought to do so again you told him you didn't need to hear from him again. Can you comment on that please?

ASHCROFT: First of all, Acting Director Pickard and I had more than two meetings. We had regular meetings.

Secondly, I did never speak to him saying that I did not want to hear about terrorism. I care greatly about the safety and security of the American people and was very interested in terrorism and specifically interrogated him about threats to the American people and domestic threats in particular.

One of the first items which came to my attention - which I mentioned in my opening remarks - was the question of whether we wanted to capture or find and kill bin Laden.

I carried that immediately to the national security adviser and expressed myself in that matter.

Together with the vice president of the United States, we got a briefing at FBI headquarters regarding terrorism. And I asked the question, "Why can't we arrest these people because I believe an aggressive arrest and prosecution model is the way to disrupt terrorism?" These are things about which I care deeply.

When the Senate Appropriations Committee met on May 9, in the summer of 2001, I told the committee that my Number One priority was the attack against terror; that we would protect Americans from terror. I wrote later to them a confirming letter saying that we had no higher priority.

These are the kinds of things that I did in order to communicate very clearly my interest in making sure that we would be prepared against terror.

In addition when we went for the largest increase in counterterrorism budgeting before 9-11 in the last five years, that signaled a priority in that respect. And when we, for the next year, had a 13 percent higher counterterrorism budget than was provided in the last year of the Clinton administration, it was also a signal that counterterrorism was a matter of great concern to us and that we would treat it seriously.

THOMPSON: After you took office did you ever hear or participate in any discussions in the Bush administration about responding to the attack on the Cole, which took place late in the Clinton administration, since it was now apparent at some time in 2001 that not only was al-Qaida responsible for the attack on the Cole, but that Osama bin Laden directed it? Was there ever any such consideration given in the Bush administration to responding to the attack on the Cole with a military strike?

ASHCROFT: Well, I was briefed by the CIA on a number of occasions, as well as by the FBI. And I did ask about the Cole.

As you know, our FBI personnel were on the scene within almost hours after the event, and they developed a preliminary understanding that the individuals conducting the attack were associated with al-Qaida.

But the ability to come to a conclusion, to build the nexus back from those actually involved in the attack to those who were command- and-control figures in al-Qaida, was not established until - and I'm not sure of the date - I think it must have been late in the summer or early in the fall of 2001.

So my briefings through the summer during the elevated threat period and the like, and my briefings that were earlier in the year, for instance at the FBI, communicated this believed nexus in terms of the operational involvement of individuals associated with al-Qaida. But they did not have a clear, considered provable understanding of whether the command and control of senior al-Qaida officials was really involved.

THOMPSON: We've responded with greatly increased security precautions to the hijackings that took place on Sept. 11. But who in the government, who in the Bush administration, is worrying about the next war and other means that al-Qaida may use to attack us - or other groups, Hezbollah, Hamas, other groups - on our soil, on other portions of our infrastructure besides aircraft and airports? Our food supply. Our water supply. Our oil pipelines. Our railroads. Our chemical factories.

Who's worrying about that, and how are they worrying about that? And what assurance do the American people have that somebody is indeed worrying about the next war?

ASHCROFT: Well, frankly, there are a number of us who are worrying about the next war, and we understand that al-Qaida is very likely to change its method of operation and its style to avoid detection. And it's something when we have to understand the nature of this enemy that we face. It's an enemy that is not stupid. This is not some garden variety criminal who is robbing a 7-Eleven. They plan well. They undertake actions that last for years. They seek to inflict mass casualties.

We understand that they might seek to use a different style of individual, individuals who would come from different countries, that it's clear that we know that they have interest in poisons, that they have interest in toxicity, in evil chemistry and evil biology, as well as the interest which they have had in explosives.

We've seen a wide variety of explosives used around the world in the proliferation of terrorism that has followed 9-11. It's not been used here, and we're grateful that we've been successful in keeping it from happening here.

But this administration has tasked every quadrant of the administration to be alert.

In agriculture, I know very much the concerns of Secretary (Ann) Veneman. I know in transportation, the concerns of Secretary (Norman) Mineta. And I know in energy the kinds of concerns that have been expressed by Secretary (Spencer) Abraham, and the list could go on completely.

I guess I would say that we need to continue to do everything possible. When you look around the world and we see that even in cultures that are very attuned and very focused on disrupting terrorism that they are not always successful, and so we have to be at the highest level of readiness and anticipation. BEN-VENISTE: Mr. Pickard testified that as of the afternoon of September 11, 2001, he received three things that he did not know before: Number one, he received the Phoenix memorandum; number two, he received information about the (Zacarias) Moussaoui arrest and the detailed background that I won't go into now about who Moussaoui was and what we knew about why he was in the United States; and he received information that the FBI was looking for (Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi), two of the individuals who it turned out participated in the 9/11 catastrophe.

Now, given that fact, and given the fact that as I understand it from our prior meeting, you also did not know any of that information prior to 9/11, is it not possible, sir, that were you to have pulsed the FBI and directed the FBI to push up any information that it might have had, that that information might have been made available to you, to Mr. Clarke, to others contemporaneous in August and prior to 9/11?

ASHCROFT: Well, I think it's pretty clear that I was pulsing the FBI. I asked them regularly in my briefings with them if there were any evidence regarding threats domestically and the kind of conduct by the FBI was the kind of thing that I would have expected them to be involved in as a result of that kind of request on my part.

BEN-VENISTE: The statement that we've heard time and again is the FBI didn't know what it didn't know, but it also didn't know what it did know. ...

ASHCROFT: In my opening remarks, I talked about the fact that I had demanded four separate independent reviews regarding the information systems at the FBI, so that I was aware of the challenges.

The first of those challenges was revealed to me when, on the day of my going to Justice Department as attorney general, Louis Freeh pulled me aside and said, "Oh, by the way, we've got a real problem with the penetration of the FBI, we believe the individual involved to be Robert Hanssen, and access to our information systems that compromises the national integrity was revealed." That was a signal to me that we had serious problems.

Later on, I came to an understanding when we were preparing to deal with the second largest terrorist attack in the United States, which was that undertaken by Timothy McVeigh which resulted in the death of about 170 people, that in his trial we had failed to comply with a court order and we had not delivered - the FBI had not delivered about 3,000 documents, most of which were duplicates but were the subject of a court order. So I had to delay - I'd had to delay the execution to make sure that we had an innocent system as well as a guilty defendant in the case.

Additionally, I became concerned about the integrity of our information technology system when it was revealed that about 300 laptop computers were unaccounted for, and for well over 200 of them, the inspector general of the FBI, whom I asked to investigate the matter, said it couldn't be determined whether they were lost or stolen and raised the specter of national security issues.

So I understood there were problems.

But I also understood that when we went to agents and when we asked them specific questions about issues related to national security that we should expect them to respond and could expect them to respond. The FBI is populated with well-meaning, hardworking individuals. And they, I think, need to be understood for that and to be credited with that.

BEN-VENISTE: It is correct, is it not - because we have looked at the May 10th, 2001, guidance for preparing fiscal year 2003 budgets in which you indicate your priorities - there are five goals, strategic goals laid out there? It does not appear that terrorism was one of them. Is that correct? ...

ASHCROFT: The date preceding, on May the 9th, I met with the Senate Appropriations Committee and was asked about my priorities. I said my number one priority was to protect the people of the United States against terrorism.

The Department of Justice, required by the Congress to have a strategic plan, followed that plan. The plan was developed in the year 2000 by my predecessor and had a set of strategic goals. They're listed here early in the book and they are similar to the goals - they are, as a matter of fact, the goals which were used in large measure for the May 10th memorandum. And they cite some additional goals to terrorism. There's no question about that. ...

In the budgets proposed prior to September 11th, the total CT (counterterrorism) increases were 72 percent greater than the total increases for drugs and gun prosecutions combined. Now, those were the other issues that were listed as priorities of the department. What we had was a combined total of increases of $683.1 million for drugs and gun prosecutions. ...

Now I don't mean to discount those priorities. Thousands of people die on our streets as a result of gun crimes. And we are very grateful for our record there. But let the record be clear that when it comes to where the appropriation was, that we had a $1.175 billion increase for counterterrorism in those first two budgets, a $0.683 billion, or $683 million increase on drugs and guns.